Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 2
Number 1 Volume 2, No. 1: February
2009

Article 2

Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope With Terrorism
Dr. Andreas M. Bock, Ph.D.
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich & Munich University of the Federal Armed Forces

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

pp. 25-38
Recommended Citation

Bock, Ph.D., Dr. Andreas M.. "Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to
Cope With Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 2, no. 1 (2010) : 25-38.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.1.2
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss1/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope With
Terrorism
Abstract
"Coercion or negative sanctions are found to have little effect [on terrorism] and, in
important instances, are even counterproductive." In other words: fighting terrorism by
war is no use, it does not even have a deterrent effect. On the contrary, the employment of
massive military power makes it easier for terrorists to justify their attacks, to find broad
support, and to recruit new followers. This notwithstanding, I will offer an alternative way
to cope with terrorism, using George F. Kennan's concept of containment. This is the link to
our effort to effectively fight the terrorist threat: it is a battle too for the loyalties and
convictions of people. Usama bin Ladin is not the problem; given the growing threat
perception of an Islamic motivated international terrorism, he is just a complication. The
problem is a growing willingness to engage in terrorist attacks—even by apparently well
integrated and secularly educated immigrants' children of the second generation. The
convictions of people constitute the strength of a social movement. And besides its horrific
violent aspects, terrorism is a social movement intended to achieve social or political
change. Without broad support, terrorism loses its potential.
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Containment Revived: An Alternative
Way to Cope With Terrorism
Dr. Andreas M. Bock, Ph.D.

"Coercion or negative sanctions are found to have little effect [on terrorism] and, in important instances, are even counterproductive."1 That is
something we could have learned from current history as well as everyday
experience: from the French answer to the FLN in Algeria, or the South
African response to the anti-apartheid movement;2 from the spiral of violence we experience in Israel, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, and of
course from the attacks on American and European cities. It is as simple
as Archbishop Desmond Tutu puts it: "Retaliation against a suicide
bomber only gives rise to more suicide bombers."3 In other words: fighting terrorism by war is no use, it does not even have a deterrent effect. On
the contrary, the employment of massive military power makes it easier
for terrorists to justify their attacks, to find broad support, and to recruit
new followers.
This notwithstanding, I will offer an alternative way to cope with terrorism, using George F. Kennan's concept4 of containment.5 I believe that
Kennan detected the essence of the threat that Soviet communism posed
to the U.S. and to Europe after the Second World War: "It is the shadows
[…] that move the hearts."6 By this he meant that not the Russian military
capabilities and their alleged intention to go to war whatever the cost
posed an eminent and threat to the free world, but the possibility of a conversion of the young post-war governments to (Soviet) communism.
Kennan was one of the first to realize that in the aftermath of the Second
World War the U.S. and USSR fought a battle for "the loyalties and convictions of hundreds of millions of people."7 The aim of his containment
strategy was not to block Soviet communism by military force but by psychology: to reawaken the self-confidence of the European peoples.8 And
the major means to do so was the Marshall Plan: targeting the economic
reconstruction of Europe and Russia,9 not the military rearmament of a
potential ally, i.e. the European states, against the USSR.10
This is the link to our effort to effectively fight the terrorist threat: it is a
battle too for the loyalties and convictions of people. Usama bin Ladin is
not the problem; given the growing threat perception of an Islamic motivated international terrorism, he is just a complication. The problem is a
growing willingness to engage in terrorist attacks—even by apparently
well integrated and secularly educated immigrants' children of the second
generation, as Olivier Roy puts it:
25
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Britain has been astonished to discover that the terrorists responsible for the London bombings on 7 July were British citizens,
born there and apparently well integrated. One was even a convert to Islam. Yet that fits the profile of most of the second generation of al-Qa’ida terrorists that emerged at the end of the 1990s.
Most of those active internationally have a westernised background; they were born in Europe or moved there to study or
work. All had a secular upbringing. None were educated in
madrassas (religious schools), except for brief periods in the case
of the 7 July suicide bombers. In fact they went to ordinary state
schools and pursued modern studies. Moreover almost all of
them became born-again Muslims in the West.11
The convictions of people constitute the strength of a social movement.
And besides its horrific violent aspects, terrorism is a social movement
intended to achieve social or political change. Without broad support, terrorism loses its potential.

Terrorism's Weakness: Dependence on Support
Basically, terrorism is political and anti-statist in its nature.12 This
description entails an explanation why terrorism obviously always means
the use or at least threat of horrible violence.13 Terrorism is a strategy of
"relatively weak groups,"14 which for different reasons (seemingly or
effectively) lack the possibility to reach their aims by other means. Terrorist groups are based on radical ideas or ideologies that question the established social order. Their claims are by definition inconsistent with the
social systems they are arrayed against. The claim of ending the apartheid
in South Africa was absolutely inconsistent with the existence of the South
African apartheid system as such; the aim of transforming the German
economic-political system into a communist one is absolutely inconsistent with the German Grundgesetz that codifies the German political
basic order as free and democratic, and the economic order as a market,
i.e. capitalist economy. The desire—legitimate (like in the case of ANC) or
not—to implement the particular sociopolitical convictions,15 even if there
is no legal or regular possibility to do so, is one of the reasons for the
emergence of terrorism. Whether these terrorist organizations become an
eminent threat to a society or a social order depends on the dimension of
support the organization can win.
In order to reach a political aim, public support is required (no matter if it
is voluntary or enforced). That is why terrorist attacks need to draw great
attention and move the people within the political system, against which
26

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.1.2

Bock, Ph.D.: Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope With Terrorism

Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope With Terrorism

they turn, to really support their aim. By means of terror, people (members of a government or eligible voters)16 are to be forced to behave in a
certain way, to make certain decisions. And the more terrible the attack,
the more devastating the violence, the greater the public attention and the
greater the change for the terrorist organization to reach its desired (public) effect: "Do X (for example: change your policy concerning country Y),
otherwise we won't stop the attacks against your Zs (for example: citizens)!"17 Therefore terroristic violence always appears to be indiscriminate violence. It is "directed at persons who are threatened not on their
own accounts, but with a view to influencing further persons, in particular
those with power, official or otherwise, to affect the political arrangements."18 This is a "communication strategy:"19 violence is not an end in
itself, but "a kind of a signal, to communicate something to a multitude of
men."20
The bigger the support an organization enjoys, the bigger its capability to
threaten a society. Of major importance here is that terrorist groups
depend on broad support—sympathy, money, or volunteers, sometimes
from sympathizing states, that too provide money, weapons, and training
facilities and safe havens and give the claims of the terrorist group a voice
on the international stage it otherwise lacks.
Terrorist groups have to operate "underground," given that non-state violence is prima facie illegitimate violence.21 Activities planned in and carried out underground are demanding: they need and consume a lot of rare
resources, like time, money, goods and manpower; and most of all, they
are dangerous. These activities are constantly in danger of being discovered—and therefore disrupted. Therefore, as an underground organization, terrorist groups are in a situation of permanent scarcity, but have no
secured and reliable access to the resources they need; they cannot, for
example, advertise for the "job" of an assassin or a bomb engineer, establish regular trade relations to gather weapons and technology they need,
or withdraw into a safe area.22 All of this—and here we have come full circle—depends heavily on supporters (people and states) that provide it.
A prime example for the crucial dependency of terrorism on broad support is the so-called "German Autumn" caused by the Red Army Faction
(RAF) in 1977.23 The RAF perceived itself as a social revolutionary organization that aimed to change firstly the political economical order in West
Germany and secondly in Western Europe to a communist social order.
The means the RAF used were terror, kidnapping and arbitrary killing of
officials of the political-economic establishment and bombings against
German society. Even if the RAF regarded the officials of the system as
potential and, from their point of view, legitimate targets, the organiza27
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tion carefully paid attention not to harm any member of the proletariat.24
As some workers were injured by a series of bomb attacks on the Axel
Springer publishing house, the RAF not only blamed the capital, i.e. the
associates of the publishing house for not clearing the building after getting several hints by phone,25 but emphatically apologized for doing so.26
The reason for this is simple enough: the RAF considered the proletariat
or the workers in Germany as the audience of its message, i.e. as allies in
its fight to change the system. The bombings, kidnappings and killings
were just tactical instruments to provoke the state to exaggerated reactions and, by doing so, to alienate the workers from the state and initiate a
proletarian rebellion:
That is the dialectic of anti-imperialist combat: that through the
[…] reaction of the system, the escalation of the counter-revolution, the transformation of the political state of emergency into a
military state of emergency, the enemy becomes apparent […]
and, by the means of its own terror, alienates the crowd, intensifies the antagonism, to necessitate the revolutionary battle.27
The problem was: the RAF received no support from the German workers.
There were only isolated sympathizers but no broad, no reliable support
from the middle of the society. Even the fact that the German Democratic
Republic supported the RAF's self-proclaimed revolutionary fight against
the "class enemy" in the West28 could not alter the factual insignificance
of the RAF. But measured by its own aims, to initiate a revolution in
Germany that would literally set fire to the whole of Western Europe, the
RAF totally failed. Conversely, German society demonstrated its stability.

Fighting Fire with Fire?
After 9/11 the U.S. declared a "war on terrorism" toppling the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, established special
interrogation centers not only at Guantanamo Bay but also in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and spent an enormous amount of money on defense and
anti-terror measures:

28
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President Bush's defense budget request of $481.4 billion—an 11
percent boost over last year—pushes U.S. defense spending to
levels not seen since the Reagan-era buildup of the 1980s. In
addition, the president is seeking a projected $141.7 billion in
emergency supplemental funding for 2008 for the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan and for broader anti-terrorism efforts—bringing
the total spent in those arenas since 2001 to $661 billion, eclipsing in real terms the cost of the Vietnam War.29
To test the appropriateness of the instruments of the "war on terrorism"
we only have to ask one simple question: Has the world become more
secure? Obviously not. The Taliban recaptured parts of Afghanistan, Iraq
turned into an open training and recruiting center for "offspring" terrorists, and—this is most fatal—we have to ascertain a growing willingness to
engage in anti-Western terrorism.
Even so, the RAF failed with its concept to mobilize the mass of workers,
the underlying strategy was right (from the viewpoint of the terrorist
organization): to use the harsh and maybe excessive state reaction as evidence for the legitimacy of its actions and a trigger for growing support
and—in the case of the RAF—revolution. Unlike the RAF, several terrorist
organizations are able to benefit from the vicious circle of violence and
counter-violence. This is true for so differing organizations and groups
like the ANC, FLN, Hizbollah30 or al-Qa’ida. Besides the differences, that
cover motivations as well as aims, means and (il)legitimacy,31 they have in
common that they gained and, in the cases of Hizbollah and al-Qa’ida,
still gain broad support from the state reaction.
The same applies to the Islamic terrorism we currently perceive as the
biggest threat. The 2006 Lebanon War ended with a political defeat of
Israel,32 or, as Zaid Al-Ali expounds on opendemocracy.net "Hizbollah
has already won."33 It succeeded in defending Lebanese territory and
itself in spite of Israel's massive military efforts. However, most of all,
Hizbollah won because Israel's attacks killed hundreds of civilians that
not only increased public support for it but also helped Hizbollah recruit
new fighters. Of importance here is not the question of which side legitimately fought the war, but which side can use the emotional effects—the
pictures of destruction and of dead bodies—for its purposes.34
A terrorist organization can gain broad support, whether the idea or ideology it stands for (or it claims to stand for) responds to an important need
the addressees have. The German workers felt no need to be liberated by
the RAF from the "lodger of capitalism."35 But bin Ladin obviously
responds to a—and this is really alarming—growing feeling of discrimina29
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tion in the Muslim world. A feeling that is inter alia fed by the Palestine
conflict. Palestine is part of the collective consciousness of the Muslim
world; part of it is propaganda, part is hypocrisy. That notwithstanding,
the Palestinian conflict is proof of a biased international system: of a
political disaster that left hundred of thousands of people stranded—
hopelessly and impecuniously, compliant victims to organizations that
offer money and a better life—and has remained unsolved for decades.
A second example, that also circulates through the Muslim world as evidence not only for a biased international order but as brutal discrimination of Muslims, is the UN sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein's Iraq,
beginning in 1990 and continued until the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in
2003. The sanctions were imposed on the regime following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, banning financial resources and all trade except for
medicine36 and, in some circumstances, food. Under U.S. President
Ronald Reagan, the sanctions were initially intended to bring about a
change of system in Iraq, but later, under U.S. President Bill Clinton, only
the complete disclosure of the Iraqi weapons program was settled for. The
dimension of the humanitarian cataclysm is dubious to date. Estimates of
direct casualties of the sanctions reach up to "One million Iraqis, mostly
children."37 The sanctions made people suffer for a regime and its politics
they were obviously not responsible for; Saddam's Iraq was a dictatorship
characterized by the powerlessness of the subject. Second, the U.S. and
Europe armed Saddam's regime, providing him with weapons and technology to fight the so-called mullah-regime in Iran.38
It is examples like this, together with references to current coercive measures, applied in the "war on terrorism," that enable Usama bin Ladin not
only to justify al-Qa’ida's assaults, but also to construct the threat of Western crusade against Islam as a whole. In an interview, recorded by al
Jazeera on 20th October 2001, the second week of the U.S. attacks on
Afghanistan, bin Ladin made connections between the sanctions on Iraq,
the war in Afghanistan and a new crusade: "What about the people that
have been killed in our lands for decades? More than 1,000,000 children
died in Iraq, and they are still dying […] this is a war which, like previous
wars, is reviving the Crusades."39

Containment Revived
We seriously have to take into consideration that Muslims all over the
world are sharing a growing feeling of insecurity, of threat, of inferiority.
To fight terrorism, we have to concentrate on helping people lose their
insecurity and angst, and get back their self-esteem. Maybe that sounds a
30
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little bit esoteric and as much inappropriate as possible to formulate concrete politics. But this was, as John Lewis Gaddis notes, the underlying
notion of Kennan's strategy of containment:
More serious [than a Russian war to conquer Europe and Japan,
A.B.] was the possibility of conquest by psychological means: the
danger that the people of Western Europe and Japan […] might
become so demoralized by the combined dislocations of war and
reconstruction as to make themselves vulnerable, through sheer
lack of self-confidence, to communist-led coups, or even to communist victories in free elections.40
Communism enjoyed broad support after the Second World War, given
that it was largely communists who organized the resistance against
Hitler and Nazi-Germany.41 Similarly, Islam, i.e., its radical interpretation, is perceived as an answer and a solution: it creates a feeling of
belonging, it is an explanation for the perceived felt discrimination, and it
provides a justification for confrontation. The last point is decisive: radical Islam vitally needs the enmity of the Western World, no matter
whether it is real or just propaganda; that exactly correlates with
Kennan's assessment of Soviet communism. In his famous "Long
Telegram," he analyzed that Soviet communism is dependent on the
enmity of the Western World. It is a legitimation "for the dictatorship
without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not
dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand."42
Kennan's strategy of containment was based upon two pillars. First,
European economic rehabilitation: "This would have the advantage…of
removing or at least mitigating the conditions that had made indigenous
communism popular there in the first place."43 And second, the conviction that might does not make right, or, as Kennan told students at the
Naval Academy in May 1947: "Our country has made the greatest effort in
modern times…to treat questions of international life from the standpoint
of principles and not of power."44 The former would help to restore self
esteem of the European people, the latter to decrease mistrust and insecurity: "The United States…must demonstrate by its own self-confidence
and patience, but particularly by the integrity and dignity of its example,
that the true glory of Russian national effort can find its expression only
in peaceful and friendly association with other peoples and not in
attempts to subjugate and dominate those peoples."45
Both pillars may serve as guidelines for anti-terrorism policies that
endeavor to delve to the bottom of the problem, instead of dealing only
with the symptoms. This strategy can only function in the long term. The
31
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movie "Charlie Wilson's War" is a true depiction of U.S. support for the
finally successful mujahidin resistance against Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. And so it ends, as Charles Wilson writes in the Washington
Post, "congressional appropriators turn down my request for funds to
rebuild Afghanistan's schools, roads and economy."46 For the rehabilitation of a whole country, a million dollars was too much; however, not so
one billion dollars for financing a war. Of course, the reality is not as simple as that: a stronger Western engagement in the buildup of Afghanistan
would have avoided the rise of the Taliban. But, as the success of
Hizbollah teaches us, gaps will be filled. And, yes, it makes a difference,
whether I teach children in an open and free educational institution or in
madrassas (religious schools), that are aimed at indoctrination. With a
simple effect: once accepted social habits and socially embedded convictions are very hard to question or change.
During the European economic rehabilitation, the U.S. focused on aid and
not on arms, as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal explained:
At the present time we are keeping our military expenditures
below the levels which our military leaders must in good conscience estimate as the minimum which would in themselves
ensure national security. By so doing we are able to increase our
expenditures to assist in European recovery. In other words, we
are taking a calculated risk in order to follow a course which
offers a prospect of eventually achieving national security and
also long-term world stability.47
In times of the "war on terrorism," the signs have changed and "America's
civilian institutions of diplomacy and development continue to be chronically undermanned and underfunded. We spend 1 percent of the federal
budget on these critical elements of our foreign policy, compared with 22
percent on the military and weapons."48
This shift of emphasis leads to the second pillar: that might does not make
right. Economic wealth, combined with social development, is a premise
of a people's self-esteem; but it must be accompanied by an international
environment that is not discriminating. Discrimination is a kind of social
exclusion that causes the desire of belonging. And Islamic groups respond
to this desire, intensifying the opposition: We versus Them.
In practical terms: our international order must become subject to principle, not power, i.e. that rules and norms are binding on every state, the
weak as well as the mighty. The Hobbesian "might makes right" creates
only insecurity, given firstly that power is never absolute, but always rela32
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tive. "For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to
kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with
others that are in the same danger with himself."49 Our world must
become more just. As long as we have unsolved hot spots like the
Palestine conflict, or a biased implementation of international treaties, as
long as one part of the world can easily make an legal decision that costs
thousands of innocent lives and as long as the place of birth determines
one's lifespan and prospects,50 there will always be new supporters and
followers for terrorists like Usama bin Ladin. We need to meet an
American-European task: more economic development and an international order that is ruled by principle, not by power.
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Endnotes
1 Frey (2004), p. IX.
2 In the 1980's the U.S.A categorized the ANC as a terrorist organization; it took the
U.S. Administration until June 2008 to delete Nelson Mandela from the State
Department's terror watch list. I will return to the examples of the FNL and ANC in
greater detail later.
3 Quoted in: Govier (2002), p. 94.
4 Hereafter I intend to withdraw my remarks on Kennan's understanding of containment, not on the concept that was implemented in the 1950s.
5 I do believe and hope, that men can learn from history and that governments are
able and willing to act on lessons taught by history.
6 Kennan, George F., quoted by: Gaddis (1982), p. 35.
7 Kennan, quoted by Gaddis (1982), p. 51.
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8 As Gaddis notes, the strategy of containment was aimed at "the psychological malaise in countries bordering on the Russian sphere of influence that made them, and
hence the overall balance of power, vulnerable to Soviet expansive tendencies."
(Gaddis (1982), p. 35)
9 The European Recovery Program, which is better known as the Marshall Plan, was
originally intended for Europe as a whole, including parts of the USSR and Russia.
Stalin, who initially showed some interest in joining the plan, refused in the end.
And as a clear sign of Soviet power and influence, he forced Czechoslovakia and
Poland, which intended to enlist the Marshall Plan, to reject U.S. aid. Stalin correctly realized that the Plan would decrease Soviet control of Eastern Europe and
would make it easier for these countries to escape Soviet hegemony.
10 At this point we may already see the advantages Kennan's strategy has over a military concept of rearmament and confrontation. The Marshall Plan was literally an
open bid, excluding not Russia and not even Germany. Something that is impossible to say about any military strategy.
11 Roy, Olivier: "Britain: homegrown terror"
(http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/05terror), accessed on 13th September 2008).
The same is true for the so-called "Sauerland-terrorists," that planned a series of
bombings against U.S.-citizens and U.S.-facilities in Germany in 2007. Two of the
three suspected and arrested persons are German converts, the third is a Turkish
Muslim. One of the German converts is considered by the investigators as the
leader of the gang and founder of a German cell of the "Islamic Jihad Union."
12 In contrast to various authors like Michael Walzer, Noam Chomsky or Uwe
Steinhoff, I understand terrorism to be decidedly anti-statist. Even though nonstatist groups and states can take recourse to the same means, that is: exercise terror. However, there is a crucial difference insofar, as we consider statist violence
basically legitimate, even if it kills and hurts. In contrast to that, we principally consider non-statist violence to be illegitimate.
13 Cf. Waldmann (1998), p. 10.
14 Ibid., p. 10.
15 I perceive a religiously-motivated terrorism like the one practiced by al-Qa’ida as a
sub-category of terrorism as such, given that the aim to implement an Islamic theocracy is the same as the aim to implement a communistic order or to split a region
as it all means a fundamental change to the present socio-political order.
16 Following the devastating bomb attacks on 11th March 2004 on several commuter
trains in Madrid, the Spanish voters deselected the government of José Maria
Assnar. Prime Minister Assnar was not only a close ally and strong supporter of the
Iraq policy of U.S. President George W. Bush, he also blamed the Basque underground organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) for the attacks so as to avoid a
connection between the attacks and his Iraq policy. However, captured members of
an al-Qa’ida cell soon confessed to the attacks, in which 191 people got killed and
1,500 were hurt. The leader of the opposition and socialist José Luis Rodriguez
Zapatero went into the election campaign with the promise to withdraw the
Spanish troops out of Iraq. On the 14th March Zapatero was elected Prime
Minister; he immediately announced the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from
Iraq.
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17 Cf. Narveson (1991), p. 119–120.
18 Ibid., p. 117.
19 Waldmann (1998), p. 12.
20 Ibid., p. 12–13.
21 Although we know an individual right of self-defense, a group based right of
defense is heavily contested. The case of the ANC is exemplary: though it fought an
obviously inhuman and discriminatory political system, the South African state
could draw upon the basic assumptions of the UN-System, i.e. that states and not
non-state groups, no matter what their aim may be, are the legitimate entities of
the international system. Consequently, the U.S.A regarded the ANC as an illegitimate terrorist group.
22 Just remember the support the Taliban regime offered Usama bin Ladin and his alQa’ida: without such areas of retreat, that were safe, i.e. without real danger for bin
Ladin to be turned over to the U.S.A, and hard to capture, like the mountain fortress Tora Bora, it is doubtful, whether he would still be on the loose.
23 The Red Army Faction operated from the 1970s to 1993, but especially through the
1970s. The RAF is responsible for 34 deaths including many secondary targets such
as chauffeurs and bodyguards. The kidnapping and killing of the Federal Public
Prosecutor Siegfried Buback in April 1997 signified the dawn of a bloody chapter in
RAF operations, which finally led to a national crisis that became known as "German Autumn." But it did not, nor did it ever endanger the German social order.
24 Cf. Waldmann (1998), p. 31.
25 To be fair, it should be noted, that at this time the so-called Springer Press received
numerous idle threats and hate calls; so it was not further surprising that the RAF
warnings were not taken seriously.
26 Cf. Aust (2008), p. 339ff.
27 Leaflet of the RAF, quoted in: Waldmann (1998), p. 27.
28 How broad and well organized this state support for the RAF was became apparently only after the end of the GDR and the opening of the files of the Ministerium
für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security) (cf. Aust (2008), p. 13–14).
29 Tyson, Ann Scott: Bush's Defense Budget Biggest Since Reagan Era
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/
AR2007020501552.html, accessed on: 13th September 2008).
30 The classification of Hizbollah is not an easy task, given that the United States,
Israel, Canada and the Netherlands list it as a terrorist organization, while the
United Kingdom and Australia only list its security arm (the "Hizbollah External
Security Organisation") as a terrorist organization. In most of the Arab and Muslim
world the Hizbollah is regarded as a legitimate resistance movement.
31 Even so I hold the resistance of the ANC as legitimate, I fiercely condemn the
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